As a fundamental phenomenon in nature, randomness has a wide range of applications in the fields of science and engineering. Among different types of random number generators (RNG), quantum random number generator (QRNG) is a kind of promising RNG as it can provide provable true random numbers based on the inherent randomness of fundamental quantum processes. Nevertheless, the randomness from a QRNG can be diminished (or even destroyed) if the devices (especially the entropy source devices) are not perfect or ill-characterized. To eliminate the practical security loopholes from the source, source-independent QRNGs, which allow the source to have arbitrary and unknown dimensions, have been introduced and become one of the most important semidevice-independent QRNGs. Herein a method that enables ultra-fast unpredictable quantum random number generation from quadrature fluctuations of quantum optical field without any assumptions on the input states is proposed. Particularly, to estimate a lower bound on the extractable randomness that is independent from side information held by an eavesdropper, a new security analysis framework is established based on the extremality of Gaussian states, which can be easily extended to design and analyze new semi-device-independent continuous variable QRNG protocols. Moreover, the practical imperfections of the QRNG including the effects of excess noise, finite sampling range and resolution are taken into account and quantitatively analyzed. Finally, the proposed method is experimentally demonstrated to obtain a high secure random number generation rate of 15.07 Gbits/s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are of extreme importance for a wide range of applications in both scientific and commercial fields [1] , such as numerical simulations, lottery games and cryptography. A significant example is the quantum key distribution (QKD), in which the true random numbers are essential for both quantum states preparation and detection to guarantee unconditional security [2] [3] [4] . Classical pseudo random number generators (PRNG), which are based on the computational algorithms, have been widely used in modern information systems. However, due to the deterministic and thus predictable features of the algorithms, PRNG are not suitable for certain applications where true randomness is required. Distinct from the PRNG, true random number generators (TRNG) extract randomness from physical random processes [5] . An important type of TRNGs is the quantum random number generator (QRNG), which is based on the intrinsic randomness of fundamental quantum processes and can provide truly unpredictable and irreproducible random numbers [6] [7] [8] .
The existing QRNG protocols can be mainly classified into three different categories as in Ref. [7] , i.e. the practical, device-independent and semi-device-independent QRNGs. Till now, various practical QRNG protocols, which can realize a high random number generation rate with relatively * lizhengyu@pku.edu.cn low cost [7] , have been proposed and demonstrated, including measuring photon path [9, 10] , photon arrival time [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , photon number distribution [16] [17] [18] [19] , vacuum fluctuation [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , phase noise [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] and amplified spontaneous emission noise [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] of quantum states. However, practical QRNGs can produce true random numbers with informationtheoretical provable security only if the randomness source and detection devices are trusted and fulfill with the model assumptions, which usually fails in cases that the devices are complex or controlled by eavesdroppers [7] . To avoid the defects, device-independent (DI) QRNG, which can generate verifiable randomness without assumptions on the source and measurement devices by observing the violation of Bell's inequality, have been proposed [42, 43] . Although DI-QRNG protocols (including both randomness expansion [44] [45] [46] [47] and amplification [48, 49] protocols) have advantage of the selftesting randomness, they are highly challenging in realistic implementations (e.g. not loss tolerant), and the generation speed is usually too slow for practical applications [47] . Thus, QRNG protocol with reasonable assumptions and high practical performance is meaningful and greatly needed. To balance the performance and the security, the semi-deviceindependent QRNG provides a trade-off between the practical and device independent QRNGs, where high speed and lowcost informational provable randomness can be generated under several reasonable assumptions without requiring trusted and complete model assumptions on all devices [7, [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] . Particularly, as the quantum entropy source device is usually a complicated physical system in practice and crucial for randomness generation, any deviations in the real-life implementation from its model assumptions may affect the output randomness [50] . Therefore, how to design a QRNG protocol without any assumption on the source device become an important and meaningful issue. To solve this problem, sourceindependent (SI) QRNG protocols based on measuring single photon path [50] and vacuum fluctuation [51] are proposed and experimentally verified, in which the output randomness can be certified even when the source is uncharacterized and untrusted, and the corresponding random number generation rates are 5 Kbits/s and 1.7 Gbits/s, respectively.
In this paper, a source-independent continuous-variable (CV) QRNG protocol, which requires no assumption on the source, is proposed by measuring quadrature fluctuations of quantum optical field and experimentally demonstrated. Compared to previous works where security analysis is based on entropic uncertainty [51] , we demonstrate a new method to estimate a lower bound on the extractable randomness independent from classical or quantum side information held by an eavesdropper (Eve) based on the extremality of Gaussian states [55] . The security analysis model shows similarity to that of CV-QKD [56] , where rich theoretical tools exist, and can be easily extended to design and analyze new semidevice-independent CV-QRNG protocols, e.g. semi-deviceindependent CV-QRNG protocols with different input states or measurements. Furthermore, several practical issues of the protocol, including excess noise, finite detection range and resolution are quantitively analyzed, and the optimal choices of experimental parameters are discussed. It is shown that the proposed protocol is significantly resistant to noise and loss, which can be realized with off-the-shelf commercial devices and enable ultra-fast randomness generation rates. The final experimental secure random number generation rate, which reaches up to 15 Gbits/s based on the proposed method, is much faster than previous SI-QRNG results.
II. SI-CV-QRNG PROTOCOL
A schematic of the proposed SI-CV-QRNG protocol is described as follows (as shown in Fig. 1 ):
(i) Randomness Source Preparation: Eve prepares an untrusted and uncharacterized source with quantum states ρ A in arbitrary dimension, where Eve has access to a quantum system E correlated with system A, and sends ρ A to the balanced homodyne measurement device of Alice. (ii) Measurement: Alice measures the X quadrature of ρ A to generate random bits with measurement results a i , and randomly samples n c (check samples) out of n tot (total measurements) to measure P quadrature of ρ A to check the purity of the input states based on a random initial seed with length t. The measurement is assumed to be trusted and well calibrated, and all the excess noise is assumed to be introduced by a quantum correlated Eve as in Refs. [51, 56] .
(iii) Parameter Estimation: The covariance matrix (CM) γ A of ρ A is estimated based on Alice's measurement results on quadratures X and P,
where V x and V p are the variance of X and P quadratures, and c is the co-variance between X and P quadratures for ρ A .
(iv) Randomness Estimation and Extraction: Alice can extract asymptotically (n tot − n c ) (H(a i ) − S (a i : E)) − t final randomness in n tot measurements by using informational provable randomness extractor, such as Toeplitz-matrix hashing extractor, where H (a i ) is the Shannon entropy of Alice's measurement results a i and S (a i : E) is the quantum mutual information between Eve's quantum state ρ E and Alice's measurement results a i .
In this protocol, no assumptions are made on the dimensions and purity of the input states [51] , which are difficult to verify experimentally. Indeed, it is typically difficult to prepare and keep a real quantum system in a pure state. The detection is assumed to be trusted and all the excess noise is due to a quantum correlated Eve, which shows similarity with security analysis of CV-QKD and is the most conservative option [56] . In fact, the method can also take into account the classical side information hold by Eve effectively as in Refs. [23, 51] .
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Suppose Alice's homodyne detection is ideal (with infinite range and resolution), then the measurement results of quadrature X for ρ A is a continuous variable a. The asymptotically extractable randomness per measurement that uniform and uncorrelated from quantum side information held by Eve is,
where H(a) is the classical Shannon entropy of Alice's ideal measurement results on X, which is not well-defined for continuous variable (Alice actually gets a discrete variable a i in practice as explained below), and S (a : E) is the Holevo's bound between Eve's quantum state ρ E and Alice's measurement results a, which is an upper bound of Eve's quantum side information. We assume Eve holds a purification of the input state ρ A = T r E {|ϕ AE ϕ AE |}, which is optimal for Eve. Then one has,
where p(a) is the probability density distribution of 
Alternatively, one can verify that R fits all the three conditions for Lemma 1 in Ref. [55] , which also infers that
given a finite CM of ρ A . In fact, the security of CV-QKD protocols against collective attacks have been proved with similar methods [56] .
In practice, Alice's coarse-grained homodyne measurement is imperfect (with finite range and resolution) and modeled as follows. First, Alice utilizes an ideal homodyne detector to measure the quadrature of input states with continuous output a following probability density distribution p(a), which cannot be read. Second, Alice digitizes the continuous data a into n bits a i following probability distribution p dis (a i ) by an ADC with sampling range [−N + ∆/2, N − ∆3/2] and resolution n (see Appendix A for details) [23] , which is the actual output of a real-life homodyne detector. Upon measurement, the continuous signal a is discretized into a i over 2 n bins with precision ∆ = N/2 n−1 . Then, the extractable randomness is reduced to 
which indicates that local operation on one part of a state cannot increase the mutual information between two parties (see Appendix B for detail proofs). Furthermore, S (a :
The remaining question is how to upper bound S ρ G A given Alice's digitized measurement results a i . Due to the digitization process, we lose the information about the distribution of a inside the discrete bins and outside the sampling range, thus one cannot calculate the exact CM for ρ A based on a i . However, given each a i corresponding to each continuous a with known upper and lower bound, one can estimate an upper bound V x (V p ) for the variance of X (P) quadrature for ρ A with a simple strategy (see Appendix C for details). Then,
where λ = V x V p , and we set c = 0 to get the upper bound of λ.
In our protocol, the input state is expected (by Alice) to be a vacuum state if not disturbed by Eve, while in fact it could be an arbitrary quantum state ρ A prepared by Eve (e. g. thermal state or squeezed state). Define the variance of vacuum fluctuation as σ 2 vac = 1 (all the relevant quantities are normalized by vacuum fluctuation in the following). In practice, the measurement results of quantum state are unavoidable mixed with excess noise ε (due to classical or quantum side information held by Eve), which is the difference between measured quadrature variance (σ 2 ) and the expected vacuum fluctuation, i.e. ε = σ 2 − 1. Define the QCNR (quantum to classical noise ratio) as 10log 10 (1/ε). A typical example is that σ 2 = V x = V p = 1 + ε, due to a classical Eve that controls symmetric electronic noise of the detection [23] or a quantum Eve that holds a purification of input state [51] . In this case, Alice's homodyne measurement results a on quadrature X (or P) is expected to be a continuous variable following Gaussian distribution with variance σ 2 and null mean value,
The corresponding CM of ρ A is γ A = 1 + ε 0 0 1 + ε , with upper bounded
Then, the corresponding probability distribution p dis (a i ) after discrete sampling is
Then one can estimate the upper bounds of V x , V p and S (a i : E) as in Appendix C. Note that the model in Eqs. (4) and (5) also fit with the asymmetric quantum states (i.e. V x V p ).
In the above security analysis model, no assumptions are made on the input states, which remove Eve's sideinformation on source. Therefore, the extracted randomness is source device loophole-free.
IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The practical issues of the prpposed QRNG protocol, such as sampling range N, precision n of homodyne detection, and excess noise ε will directly affect the performance of the protocol. Roughly speaking, the performance of the protocol attains near optimal by setting N ∈ [3σ, 5σ] given fixed n and ε, increases (decreases) with n (ε) given fixed N, and shows resistant to excess noise.
A. Effects of finite sampling range
The finite sampling range will make us lose the information about probability distribution of a outside the detection range, directly influence the measured probability distribution p dis (a i ) given p(a) (as in Appendix A), and thus affect the classical information H(a i ) of measurement results (as in Fig. 2(a) ), the estimated upper bound V x (as in Appendix C) and Eve's information S (a i : E) (as in Fig. 2(b) ). For a fixed resolution n, the effects of dynamical sampling range N are:
1. If it is too small, the measurement outcomes become more predictable, and the Shannon entropy will reduce dramatically as in Fig. 2 (a) due to the oversaturated measurement results, which will compromise both the rate and the security of the random number generation. Meanwhile, one cannot estimate precisely the CM of the input states ρ A , i.e. overestimate the variance of a based on a i , thus overestimate Eve's information S (a i : E) (as in Fig. 2(b) ).
2. If it is chosen too large, most sampling bins will be unoccupied, and most measurement results lie in central bins, which will reduce the extractable randomness.
Finally, the extractable randomness R dis (a i |E) increases significantly with N when it is small, and reduces slowly after the optimal choice of N as in 2(c). In practice, the absolute (8) and (9) . The excess noise is chosen to be ε = 0.1 and ρ A is assumed to be a symmetric Gaussian state with
value of N for an ADC dvice is usually fixed. However, one can control the relative value of N in shot-noise-unit (SNU) by adjusting the amplification parameter of homodyne detection (by controlling the power of LO or electronic amplifier). Usually, setting N ∈ [3σ, 5σ] in SNU will attain performance close to the optimal strategy.
B. Effects of finite sampling resolution
The finite resolution n will make us lose the information about probability distribution of a inside discrete intervals
− 1} (as in Appendix A). Given a fixed N, the larger the n, the more information can be got about a. It is clear that the performance of the protocol will increase with resolution n as in Fig. 3 . Given a fixed sampling range N, the effects of resolution n are:
1. If n is small (∆ is large), one cannot estimate precisely the CM of ρ A (see Appendix C), thus overestimate the variance of quadratures for ρ A and Eve's information S (a i : E). Furthermore, most measurement results lie in central bins (see Appendix A), which will reduce the Shannon entropy significantly (almost linearly) as in Fig. 3 .
The classical information H(a i ) increases almost lineally
with n, while the estimated Eve's information reduces with n. As a result, the total extractable randomness will increase with n (as in Fig. 3 ).
In practice, given a fixed N, one should choose a larger n to attain better performance.
C. Effects of excess noise
In our protocol, the detection is assumed to be trusted and well characterized, and all the excess noise is due to a quantum correlated Eve. The excess noise or QCNR mainly decides the correlation between Eve's quantum state and Alice's measurement results, which is a key parameter in security analysis. It is clear that S (a i : E) increases (decreases) with ε (QCNR), and one needs to choose proper N and n to get a tighter upper bound on S (a i : E). For a given n, the optimal value N varies with different QCNR, as in Fig. 4 . For given N and ε, one can obtain a tighter bound of S (a i : E) with larger n, as in Fig. 5 . Even when excess noise is much larger than quantum noise, one still can get a tight bound on Eve's information. The final performance of the protocol is resistant against to the excess noise as shown in Fig. 6 . More surprisingly, even if the QCNR goes below 0 (e.g. -10 dB), that is, excess noise due to Eve becomes larger than quantum noise, one can still obtain a nonzero number of certified random bits that are independent of Eve's side information. This means one can use high bandwidth commercial balanced receivers which does not require the receiver's high QCNR (e.g. ≥ 10dB) as in former CV-QRNG experiment based on vacuum fluctuation [20] [21] [22] or CV-QKD experiment, and thus dramatically increases the random number generation rates.
An interesting and important question is what is the re- lationship between the system configuration and the maximal tolerable excess noise, or equivalently, the lowest QCNR that still keeps the extractable randomness non-negative. Intuitively, no matter how low the QCNR is, there is always some quantum randomness existing in the measurement results, which can be extracted as long as the resolution n is high enough, i.e., at least to let the quantum randomness part change one bit of the measurement result. Considering that the Gaussian state extremality theorem and the assumption that Eve holds the purification of the whole state are used to estimate R dis (a i |E), it is natural to 'imagine' the whole state is a two-mode squeezed state with variance σ 2 . In principle, Eve could provide X-squeezed states to Alice to gain more advantage than vacuum states, due to its reduced variance V sq x = 1/σ 2 , since the final random bits are extracted only from the X-quadrature measurements. Thus, we predict that, if the quantum randomness are contained in two or more bins, i.e.,
We check the prediction numerically with conditions n = 8, 12, 16 and different QCNRs. In Fig. 7 (a) , R dis (a i |E) with several typical QCNRs (−10dB, −20dB, −30dB) are shown, and it is found k ≈ 3.05, which is almost the same for other different QCNRs (see the black solid line in Fig. 7 (b) ). However, if taking into consideration the modification of V x as in Appendix C, it requires higher resolution n (smaller bin width ∆ max , see the red dashed line in Fig. 7 (b) ).
V. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
To validate the proposed protocol, a SI-CV-QRNG experimental setup is built based on balanced homodyne receiver to measure the vacuum fluctuations as in Fig. 8 . We implemented an all-in-fiber setup with off-the-shelves devices. The local oscillator (LO) is a narrow line 1550 nm laser (Thorlabs SLF1550P, linewidth 50 KHz), and the LO power is carefully adjusted to obtain the optimal performance. The 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) brings LO signal interfered with the vacuum states to the balanced receiver (Thorlabs PDB480C, bandwidth 1.6GHz). The phase of LO is randomly shifted between 0 and π/2 by a phase modulator (PM) to realized the random sampling between X and P quadratures measurements, based on an initial random seed t. Finally, the measurement results of the balanced receiver are sampled in real-time by a 12-bit ADC (TI ADC12D1800, bandwidth 3.5GHz) with a sampling rate of 1.8G SPS to acquire the raw data, which is to be analyzed by the proposed model to extract secure randomness. To obtain optimal performance, the LO power is increased from 0 mW with a fixed step of 0.5 mW and the voltage variance of the raw data corresponds to each LO power value is calculated and recorded, which is shown in Fig. 9 . In the region from 0 mW to 9.5 mW, the variance of the sampled raw data enhances linearly with the increase of the LO power and the peak value is observed at the LO power value of 10 mW due to the saturation of the balanced homodyne receiver. The LO power is fixed at 10 mW in the experiment to obtain optimal performance. The variance of the sampled raw data has a non-zero value even when the LO power is turned off, which is generally attributed to the classical noise resulted from the electromagnetic disturbance, the thermal fluctuations, the imperfection of the experimental setup and even the manipulation of eavesdroppers. In practical implementation, the classical noise can hardly be eliminated and will also be sampled into the raw data, resulting in an equivalently impure quantum states and impairing the randomness and security. In the region from 0mW to 9.5 mW, it shows a relatively clear linearity between the voltage variance and the sampled raw data. While the LO power increases higher than 9.5 mW, the detection and amplification in the balanced receiver starts to saturate, resulting in the decrease of the linearity, and the peak value of the voltage variance is obtained at 10 mW.
To measure the vacuum fluctuations with respect to the excess noise, the measurements in the frequency domain have been performed by using an RF spectrum analyzer, which is shown in Fig. 10 . Two different spectra have been acquired: the vacuum fluctuations when the LO power is 10 mW (red line) and the electrical noise when the LO power is turned off (blue line). From the figure we can see that in the detected range, the power of vacuum fluctuations is obviously higher than that of the electrical noise (the average gap between them is about 8.37dB within 0∼1.6 GHz), which means the vacuum fluctuations dominate the output and demonstrates the effectiveness of the detection.
We present the results obtained on a typical run of n tot = 2.6214 × 10 9 data samples. The corresponding measured shot noise variance is 5.5572 × 10 −4 V 2 , excess noise variance is 6.31 × 10 −5 V 2 , and the total measurement results variance of X quadratures is 6.1182 × 10 −4 V 2 . In SNU, the variance of the pure vacuum state is normalized to 1, while the experimentally measured X quadrature variance is σ 2 = 1.1135 as shown in Fig. 11 . As mentioned above, the deviation is mainly resulted from the classical noise in our experiment, which cannot be separated from the vacuum fluctuations in measurement results, leading to the impurity of the sampled raw data and the potential impairment of the T heo) , respectively. Furthermore, the number of bits necessary for the switching between the two quadratures must be accounted. Following [51] , we set n c = √ n tot . Out of the n tot measurements, the check instants can be chosen in n tot n c different ways, which can be encoded in a seed t = log 2 n tot ! n c !(n tot −n c )! bits long. The final secure generation rate, i.e. true random bits per measurement, is
Given n tot = 2.6214 × 10 9 , we employed n c = 5.12 × 10 4 bits to evaluate the extractable randomness, and t = 8.7482 × 10 5 . In our experiments, the corresponding secure rate of every measurement is R sec = 8.3746 bits with sampling rate 1.8G SPS, which indicates an equivalent secure bit generation rate of 15.07 Gbits/s.
The final generated random bits sequences have passed all the NIST and DIEHARD tests.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have proposed and experimentally demonstrated a SI-CV-QRNG protocol even if the source is untrusted or controlled by Eve. Based on the extremality of Gaussian states, a new theoretical model to estimate the lower bound on the extractable quantum randomness is established, which is similar to the security analysis of CV-QKD. The protocol is resistant to classical noise and losses (can be easily compensated by increasing LO power), which is beneficial for practical applications. The random numbers are sampled in real-time by a dedicated ADC hardware rather than oscilloscope [51] , which is beneficial to a practical QRNG design. We experimentally demonstrate the protocol with commercial devices, and the final secure random number generation rate reaches up to 15 Gbits/s, which is much higher than previous SI-QRNG results [50, 51] and shows feasibility of the protocol with an ultra-fast, cheap and compact CV-QRNG. By using high bandwidth commercial balanced receivers and fast LO phase shifter, the secure generation rate can be increased to tens of Gbits/s.
The finite-size analysis should be investigated in further research, where one can use the fruitful theoretical tools built in CV-QKD. The SI-QRNG protocol proposed here is actually a CV-QKD protocol with a trivial sender, who always sends the vacuum state. Therefore, one can follow the same universal composable framework (UCF) in Ref. [57] [58] [59] [60] . However, the finite-size analyze of SI-QRNG has two main differences with CV-QKD under UCF, i.e., no need for error correction, and only one parameter is statistically counted and tested in parameter estimation test. The core of finite-size analysis is to evaluate Eve's information about the measured random bit sequence, represented by a quantity of smooth min-entropy H ε ′ min (a n Q i |E) ρ n Q that varies with data block size. Further improvements can be envisaged when squeezed states are used as input state or heterodyne detection are used as measurement device for the protocol, which can be easily analyzed by the proposed security analysis methods. In this paper, the LO power is assumed to be constant and fixed. Furthermore, security analysis against the LO power fluctuation needs to be further investigated. In our lab experiment, the LO power is relatively stable. However, in practical application, it could be influenced by the environment or even by Eve. We model Alice's real-life coarse-grained homodyne measurement process into two steps. Firstly, Alice uses an ideal homodyne detector to measure the quadrature of input states with continuous output a following probability distribution p(a), which cannot be read. Secondly, Alice digitizes the continuous variable a into n digitized bits a i following probability distribution p dis (a i ) by an ADC with sampling range N and resolution n [23, 51] , which is the actual output of a real-life homodyne detector. To be precise, Alice digitizes the data a between [−N + ∆/2, N − ∆3/2] into 2 n equal intervals with bin width ∆ = N/2 n−1 . The range is chosen so that the central bin is centered at zero. The central value of each interval represents the digitized results, while for data smaller than −N or greater than N it will be the smallest and the largest digitized value. Then, one has, where i ∈ −2 n−1 , . . . , 2 n−1 − 1 . The probability distribution p dis (a i ) reads,
Suppose a follows Gaussian distribution with variance σ 2 = 1 + ε and null mean value,
which is a typical result in vacuum fluctuation measurement. Then,
), i = i max (A4) Simulation results of the probability distribution p dis (a i ) with different sampling range and fixed resolution are shown in Fig. 12 . It is shown that a i becomes more predictable when N is too small (or large) due to the oversaturated (or unoccupied) measurement results, which will reduce the extractable randomness.
Simulation results of the probability distribution p dis (a i ) with different resolution and fixed sampling range are shown in Fig. 13 . If it is small, most measurement results lie in central bins, which will reduce the Shannon entropy dramatically. The larger the resolution, the better the extractable randomness.
Appendix B: S (a i : E) ≤ S (a : E)
Suppose Alice's measurement results of an ideal and a coarse-grained homodyne measurement on X quadratures of quantum state ρ A are a and a i (as in Appendix A), respectively, and denote the corresponding quantum state hold by Eve is ρ E|a and ρ E|a i , respectively. Then one has
and
Note that p(a) is unknown to Alice. Thus, the total system is assumed to be
One can easily verify that the overall state of Eve is the same as the ideal case,
Using Holevo's bound, one has
(B5) Using the concavity of the von Neumann entropy,
(similar for i = i min and i max ). Then, one can get
Qualitatively speaking, the digitization process can have a corresponding quantum operation acting only on Alice's side, while the operation conducting only on one part of the state can not increase the mutual information between two parties.
Appendix C: Effects of digitization on estimation of CM
The upper bound of S (ρ A ) for ρ A can be calculated by considering it is a Gaussian state with the same CM using Gaussian extremality theorem. The real CM for ρ A should be estimated through Alice's ideal detection result a, which is continuous, noted by Similarly, one can upper bound the variance of P quadrature with the same methods, V p ≥ V p . For simplicity, we set c = 0 to upper bound Eve's information. Finally, the upper bound of the symplectic eigenvalue for ρ A is λ = V x V p , and
The effects of sampling range N and resolution n on estimated upper bound of quadrature variance is shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 , respectively. Generally, one can get a tighter upper bound V x by increasing n. When N < 3σ, one will overestimate the variance of a based on measurement results a i , which will significantly overestimate Eve's information.
For the finite-size case, we can choose a relatively large sampling range N, and set the bound of energy test within [−N, N]. And we further require that even if only one digitized data exceeds the energy test bound, the energy test for the whole block fails. Therefore, for all the data blocks that pass the energy test, the upper bound of the estimated V x can be got through the same strategy as above. For the data blocks fail the energy test, this round of the protocol aborts. One should note that, the sampling range should be carefully chosen, if it's too small, too many blocks will fail; if it's too large, the estimated parameter will be too pessimistic.
